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COMMENTS
SECONDARY CONSUMER PICKETING
THE PRODUCT BOYCOTT

-

by Jesse B. Heath
I. INTRODUCTION

One of the major changes made by the Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act1 was the insertion of a prohibition
against the use of direct pressure on an unconcerned, neutral employer. The amendment made it unlawful for a union to induce
or encourage an employee to refuse to handle or work on any
goods or to perform services, or to threaten, coerce, or restrain any
employer if the objective of the union was to force that employer
to cease doing business' with another employer. This prohibition did
not make "publicity, other than picketing" unlawful if designed to
advise the public that one employer was selling the struck product
of another employer, provided this publicity did not result in a work
stoppage.' Prior to the amendment, indirect pressure exerted upon
'The National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-66 (1935), as amended by the
Taft-Hartley Act (The Labor-Management Relations Act), 29 U.S.C. S 141 (1947), last
amended by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959 (The LandrumGriffin Act), 29 U.S.C., Chapter 7, subchap. II, § 151-68 (1964), herein referred to as
the act.
Prior to the 1959 amendments, 5 8(b) (4) (A) read as follows: "(4) to engage in, or to
induce or encourage the employees of any employer to engage in, a strike or a concerted refusal in the course of their employment to use . . . or otherwise handle . . . or to perform
any services, where an object thereof is: (A) forcing or requiring any employer . . . to cease
doing business with any other person." 29 U.S.C. § 151 (1947).
2 Cessation of a part of the business between two employers is sufficient. NLRB v. Milk
Wagon Drivers Union, 335 F.2d 326 (7th Cir. 1964).
3 Section 8(b) (4) reads as follows:
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents . . .
(4) (i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by
any person engaged in commerce . . . to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the
course of his employment to use, manufacture, process, transport, or otherwise
handle or work on any goods . . . or to perform any services; or (ii) to
threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce . . . where in
either case an object thereof is: . . . (B) forcing or requiring any person to
cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the products
of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business
with any other person. . . . Provided, That nothing in this clause (B) shall
be construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary
strike or primary picketing. . . . Provided further, That for the purposes of
this paragraph (4) only, nothing contained in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of truthfully
advising the public . . . that a product or products are produced by an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another employer, as long as such publicity does not have an effect
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an employer, such as inducing his employees to cease handling the
struck product, was unlawful, but the union could place pressure
directly upon the secondary employer by placing a picket line around
his business and asking his customers to boycott the store.
This Comment will be limited to a discussion of the problems which
may arise when a union conducts secondary picketing. Secondary
picketing takes place when a union pickets the establishment of an
employer (secondary employer) with whom the union has no labor
dispute. If the union's objective is to advise the public, particularly
the customers of the secondary store, that the union has a dispute
with another employer (primary employer), the union is said to be
engaged in secondary consumer picketing. If the union asks the customers of the secondary employer to boycott only the primary employer's product, the union is engaged in a product boycott.
Before discussing the intricacies of secondary consumer picketing,
it will be helpful to consider some prefatory issues.
II. THE UNCONCERNED EMPLOYER

A. Who Is An Employer?4
A union's purpose in conducting secondary consumer picketing
is to bring about reduced purchases of the struck product and, thus,
place pressure upon the primary employer to give in to its demands.
The union may seek to bring about this result more directly by
asking the secondary employer to cease purchasing the struck product.
By the very language of section 8 (b) (4) of the act, a union cannot
induce or encourage a secondary employee to cease handling the
struck product, but it can make the same request of a secondary
employer It is important, therefore, to have some insight into the
difference between an employer and an employee.
It is at once apparent that the owner of a business is the employer
of inducing any individual employed by any person other than the primary
employer in the course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or
transport any goods, or not to perform any services, at the establishment of
the employer in such distribution ...
For an analysis of the amendments made by the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, see Aaron, The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of
1959, 73 H^Rv. L. REV. 1086 (1960); Asher, Recent Developments Under Section 8(b)(4),
16 Sw. L.J. 113 (1962); Cox, The Landrum-Griffin Amendments to the National Labor Relations Act, 44 MINN. L. REV. 257 (1959); Larson, The New Federal Labor Law, 14 Sw.
L.J. 23 (1960); The Labor-Management Reporting andDisclosure Act of 1959: A Symposium, 54 Nw. L. REV. 659-781 (1960).
4 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) defines an employer to include an agent of. the employer. This
section exempts from the term "employer" governmental institutions, charitable hospitals,
persons covered by the Railway Labor Act and labor organizations when not otherwise functioning as an employer.
, The National Labor Relations Act, § 8 (b) (4), note 3 supra.

1965 ]

COMMENTS

of that business and that the people who work under the owner and
receive his orders are employees. With the complexities of chain store
ownership and with the delegation of authority which have become
common place in modern business operations, however, there has
evolved a quasi-employer whose duties give him the semblance of
both an employer and an employee. For example, the manager of a
chain drug store commonly is delegated the authority that an owner
of a single enterprise normally would have-the hiring of certain
employees, reordering stock, and the general management of the store.
Nevertheless, he also has some of the duties of an employee in that
he must look to a supervisor or officer of the company before he can
make serious adjustments in business operations. Moreover, like an
employee, he probably is a salesman of the products sold in the store
and, at times, physically handles shipments and helps stock and restock the shelves. This type of quasi-employer, if deemed to be an
employee, could frustrate the activities of a union which intended
to conduct consumer picketing in front of the store dealing with
the struck employer. If an agent of the union approached the manager and informed him that the union intended to picket the struck
product sold in the store unless he ceased purchases from the struck
employer, the company could claim the manager was an employee
("individual employed by any other person") and allege that the
union had induced or encouraged him to cease handling a product of
another employer.' On the other hand, if the manager fell into the
category of an "employer," the company would have to prove the
union threatenen, coerced, or restrained him to cease dealing with
another employer.7
The above described dilemma was resolved by the Supreme Court
in NLRB v. Servette.s In Servette, a union sought support for its
strike against a primary employer by asking the managers of certain
supermarkets to cease handling merchandise supplied by the primary
employer. The test for determining whether the managers were "individual[s] employed by any other person" was said to be "whether
the union's appeal is to cease performing employment services, or is
an appeal for the exercise of managerial discretion."9 The Court found
that the union was asking the managers to make a managerial decision
within their authority, and that a violation of the act had not
e The act reads "any person," but for all practical purposes that person can be labeled
an "employer.".
I. 'See Sheet Metal Workers Union, Local 28 (Ferro-Co Corp.), 102 N.L.R.B. 1660
(1953); Teamsters Unionj Local 878 (Arkansas Express, Inc.), 92 N.L.R.B. 255 (1950);
Teamsters Union, Local. 294 (Conway's Express), 87 N.L.R.B. 972 (1949).
-a 377 U.S.. 46 (1964).
9
1d. at 50 n.4.

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 19:567

occurred since the union's appeal did not threaten, coerce, or restrain
the managers." Therefore, the language "any individual employed by
any other person" under section 8 (b) (4) (i) of the act applies to
a manager of a secondary store only when the union asks him to
withhold his services from the employer."
The most obvious limitation on the Servette ruling is that many
managers and supervisors do not have the authority to cancel an
order with another employer. This often would be a difficult fact
determination, but if it can be proven that a manager lacks the
authority to cease dealing with a struck employer the union probably
cannot ask him to do so without violating section 8 (b) (4) (i).
B. Who Is A Secondary Employer?
In the enactment of section 8 (b) (4) of the act,
to promote dual objectives. It wished to preserve
union in a primary dispute and, at the same time, to
from pressures arising out of controversies with
unconcerned."5 The act was not intended to shield

Congress sought
the rights of a
shield employers
which they are
employers from

'0 The Court found that the managers were authorized to decide as best they could
whether to continue doing business with Servette in face of the threat of handbilling, a
managerial decision.
11What the picketers say to the secondary employer may be evidence of an unlawful
union object. For example, an unlawful object would be shown if one of the picketers were
to tell the retailer, "We're going to shut you down."
Likewise, what the union says to the secondary employer before the picketing begins
may be evidence of an unfair labor practice. For example, assume that the union approaches
a secondary employer or an employee who has managerial discretion, and the secondary employer has a contract with the primary employer. The union asks the retailer to cease purchasing the primary employer's products. The retailer explains that he has a contract and
that if he does not continue to purchase the struck product he will breach the contract. The
union tells him that he is faced with two alternatives-a breach of the contract or picketing.
Does the union's statement "threaten, coerce, or restrain" the secondary employer? If the
union tells the retailer that it will conduct product picketing (or will do all the law allows), it is only threatening to do that which it has a legal right to do. On the other hand,
if the union does not qualify its "threat," the secondary employer may assume the union
intends secondary boycott picketing, i.e., unlawful activity. See Electrical Workers Union,
Local 25 (A.E. Electric), 148 N.L.R.B. No. 152 (1964). At this point, the retailer could
ask the Board to enjoin the union from threatening him, and even if he did not get the
injunction, the union's subsequent picketing might be colored by its previous conduct. See
General Drivers Union, Local 886 (The Stephens Co.), 133 N.L.R.B. 1393 (1961).
It is also interesting to notice the anti-trust implications which can arise when a secondary employer agrees to a union's request that he cease dealing with the primary employer. See Jewel Tea Co. v. Meat Cutters, Local 189, 331 F.2d 547 (7th Cir. 1964), cert.
granted, 379 U.S. 813 (1964); Texas Millinery Co. v. Hatters Workers Union, 229 F. Supp.
341 (N.D. Tex. 1964).
" Senator Taft explained that the purpose of section 8 (b) (4) (A), now section 8(b)
(4) (B), is to make it unlawful "to resort to a secondary boycott to injure the business of
a third person who is wholly unconcerned in the disagreement between an employer and his
employees." 93 CONG. REc. 4198 (1947). In 1949, Senator Taft again made reference to
section 8 (b) (4): "It is not intended to apply to a case where the third person is, in effect,
in cahoots with or acting as a part of the primary employer." 95 CONG. REC. 8709 (1949).
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pressure arising out of a dispute with which they are primarily concerned."5 It is important, therefore, to determine when the relationship between two employers is such that the picketed employer, with
whom the union originally had no dispute, will be considered neutral
and protected from union pressure which threatens, coerces, or restrains him in violation of section 8 (b) (4) (ii) (B) of the National
Labor Relations Act.
One is not an unconcerned or neutral employer if he is an "ally"
of the primary employer. The "ally" doctrine has been employed in
three situations. The traditional example of an ally is an employer
that handles work which the struck employer would have handled
had there been no strike.' Such work is termed "struck work," and
the employer handling the struck work is said to be allied with the
primary employer. The doctrine has also been applied in the situation
where two employers are found to constitute a single employer."
Because of the obvious difficulties in determining when two employers
are so intermingled as to become one employer, and the public policy
against piercing the corporate veil (where the two employers are
corporations), the Board has understandably been reluctant to use
this approach to find an alleged secondary employer to be allied with
the struck employer. Thirdly, in cases where the alleged secondary
employer is not handling struck work of the primary employer, the
Board previously has adopted the negative and more cautious approach merely of finding the secondary employer so related to the
primary employer that he is not neutral."
" Section 8 (b) (4) of the act is violated if the union's objective is to force a secondary
employer "to cease doing business with any other person." The National Labor Relations Act,
note I supra.
14See NLRB v. Business Mach. & Office Applicance Mechanics Conference Bd., 228
F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1955), cerl. denied, 351 U.S. 962 (1956); Brewery Workers Union,
Local 8 (Bert Williams, Inc.), 148 N.L.R.B. No. 70 (1964).

" See cases cited note 18 infra. Common control over labor policy alone may not be
sufficient for finding two employers are the same employer. Bachman Mach. Co. v. NLRB,
266 F.2d 599, 605 (8th Cir. 1959), reversing 121 N.L.R.B. 1229 (1958).

In National Union of Marine Cooks (Irwin-Lyons Lumber Co.), 87 N.L.R.B. 54 (1949),
the Board held that two corporations whose stockholders and management were approximately the same were not wholly neutral and unconcerned. The First Circuit, however,
in J. G. Roy & Sons Co. v. NLRB, 251 F.2d 771 (1st Cir. 1958), held that a showing
of actual control is necessary, i.e., that common stock ownership without the use of the
stock to exercise control over the corporation is insufficient.
" The difficulty becomes apparent with a study of NLRB v. Darlington, 380 U.S.
263 (1965). The court ordered the case remanded to the NLRB to determine if there
was a single employer and if the closing of Darlington was anti-union motivated.
"'United Bhd. of Carpenters and Joiners (J. G. Roy & Sons Co.), 118 N.L.R.B. 286
(1957); Teamsters Union, Local 282 (Acme Concrete), 137 N.L.R.B. 1321 (1962). The
recent Board decision in Warehouse Union, Local 6 (Hershey Chocolate Corp.), 153 N.L.R.B.
No. 86 (1965), states that one will be found to be an ally of a struck employer only if
(1) he is handling struck work or (2) that employer is under the same common ownership and control as the primary employer. It might be argued that this holding indicates
the Board will not apply the ally doctrine unless it can be proven that the alleged neutral
employer is handling struck work or is a single employer.
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If a third person is in fact a secondary employer, the union cannot
"threaten, coerce, or restrain" him for an object prohibited by the
act. If, on the other hand, the third person is an ally or alter ego of
the primary employer, or found to be not neutral, the alleged secondary employer is not protected by section 8 (b) (4) (B) of the act."
This means that the union can conduct itself in a manner which, had
it been picketing one truly a secondary employer, would have violated
the act. For instance, a union picketing a secondary employer must
limit its appeal to a request that the public not buy the primary
employer's product, but if the employer is not in fact secondary the
union would not be limited to product picketing. In this case, the
union lawfully could ask the customers of that employer to boycott
the store even though the picketing induced or encouraged the employees of that employer to refuse to work in whole or in part or
threatened, coerced, or restrained the employer to cease doing business with the primary employer.' The Board and the courts have
agreed that an ally is involved in the primary dispute," and, in such
cases, the union may picket the ally as though it were the primary
employer.
If, however, it is established that the person being picketed is a
secondary or neutral employer, 1 the lawfulness of the picketing
depends primarily upon the union's purpose in conducting the picket18The Board's approach to making

a determination

of who is "neutral"

is demon-

strated in the following cases: Miami Newspaper Pressmen's Union, Local 46 v. NLRB,
322 F.2d 405 (D.C. Cir. 1963); J. G. Roy & Sons Co. v. NLRB, 251 F.2d 771 (1st
Cir. 1958); Teamsters Union, Local 25 (J. C. Driscoll Transp., Inc.), 148 N.L.R.B. No.
91 (1964); Teamsters Union, Local 282 (Acme Concrete), 137 N.L.R.B. 1321 (1962);
Teamsters Union, Local 179 (Alexander Warehouse & Sales Co.), 128 N.L.R.B. 916
(1960); United Steelworkers of America (Tennessee Coal & Iron), 127 N.L.R.B. 823
(1960); Warehousemen & Distrib. Workers Union, Local 688 (Bachman Mach. Co.), 121
N.L.R.B. 1229 (1958), rev'd, 266 F.2d 599 (8th Cir. 1959); National Union of Marine
Cooks and Stewards (Irwin-Lyons Lumber Co.), 87 N.L.R.B. 54 (1949).
"Employing Lithographers of Greater Miami, Florida v. NLRB, 301 F.2d 20 (5th
Cir. 1962); Bachman Mach. Co. v. NLRB, 266 F.2d 599 (8th Cir. 1959). The fact
that one is the sole supplier of another employer does not make the secondary employer
an "ally." General Drivers Union, Local 806 (James O'Dell and H. H. Hume), 130
N.L.R.B. 788, 795 (1961).
"oSee cases cited note 14 supra. "Common situs" picketing, that is, picketing when the
primary and secondary employers are sharing the same premises, has not been discussed herein.
For a discussion of the common situs situation, see Moore Dry Dock Co., 92 N.L.R.B. 547
(1950).
" Who is a secondary employer is both a question of law and of fact. One writer feels
the Board "has decided that where the employer, under economic pressure by the union, is
itself without power to resolve the underlying dispute, such employer is the secondary or
" Kleeb, The Policy of the National Labor Relations Board Toward
neutral employer ..
Current Changes and Developments in Industrial Relations, 15 LAB. L.J. 205, 213 (1964).
Another writer is of the opinion that if the picketing or the strike exerts pressure on the
same "economic purse" and the loss of income hits the same people, neither party is a neutral
employer. Asher, Secondary Boycots-Allied, Neutral, and Single Employers, 52 GEo. L.J.
406, 418 (1964).
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ing, i.e., whether it wishes to produce a boycott of the store or merely
a boycott of the struck product.
III.

SECONDARY CONSUMER PICKETING

A. Pre-1964 Position Of The NLRB
In the application of the 1947 amendment (Taft-Hartley Act) 22
to the act, the National Labor Relations Board had declared all consumer picketing at a secondary site to be a violation of section
8 (b) (4)." The Board took the view that the picketing per se induced
the employees of the secondary employer to cease handling the struck
product." Later the Board reversed its position, holding that picketing was not per se inducive upon the employees, and that the facts

of each case determine if 'the picketing did induce or encourage the
employees.2 Nevertheless, the picketing was per se coercive upon the
secondary employer because it was foreseeable that he would suffer
economic loss which would "threaten, coerce, or restrain" him to
cease doing business with the primary employer. This point of view
was terminated by the Supreme Court's decision of NLRB v. Fruit Cq
Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760.
B. NLRB v. Fruit &q Vegetable Packers &€Warehousemen, Local 760
Tree Fruits is the most important Supreme Court decision defining
the extent to which a union can lawfully picket at the situs of a
secondary employer. In that case the parties failed to reach a new
agreement subsequent to the expiration of a collective bargaining
contract, and the union called a strike against the primary employer,
Tree Fruits Labor Relations Committee. The union began picketing
in front of various Safeway grocery stores which were selling Washington State apples, the struck product, with the ostensible purpose
of asking customers of Safeway not to buy the apples.
The union took steps to assure that the picketing would be directed
only at the struck product and not at the secondary employer's genSee note 3 supra.
Burr & Perfection Mattress Co. v. NLRB, 321 F.2d 612 (5th Cir. 1963); Upholsters
Frame & Bedding Workers Union, Local 61 (Minneapolis House Furnishing Co.), 132
N.L.R.B. 40 (1961), rev'd, 331 F.2d 561 (Sth Cir. 1964) in accordance with Tree Fruits.
Prior to Tree Fruits, a union had been allowed to follow the product so long as the primary
employer continued in control of the product. It could follow the employer or the product
to a common situs. NLRB v. Business Machine and Office Appliance Mechanics Conference
Board, Local 459, 228 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1955). The union had even been allowed to follow
the primary employer's delivery trucks to the secondary situs. Teamsters Union, Local 807
(Schultz Refrigerated Service, Inc.), 87 N.L.R.B. 502 (1949).
24 Burr & Perfection Mattress Co. v. NLRB, note 23 supra.
21 Upholsters Frame & Bedding Workers Union, Local 61 (Minneapolis House Furnishing
Co.), 132 N.L.R.B. 40 (1961), rev'd, 331 F.2d 561 (8th Cir. 1964).
28 377 U.S. 58 (1964), herein referred to as Tree Fruits.
22

22

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 19:567

eral business. The pickets were placed only at consumer entrances and
the legend on the picket sign asked the customers to boycott only
the struck product. The pickets arrived after the stores opened for
business and left before they were closed." Notice was given to the
managers and the employees of Safeway that the purpose of the
picketing was to ask the customers not to buy the struck product.
No pickups or deliveries were interfered with and there were no work
stoppages.
The primary employer filed charges against the union alleging that
it had violated section 8 (b) (4) (ii) (B) of the act by threatening,
coercing, or restraining Safeway with the objective of forcing Safeway to cease doing business with the primary employer.
The Board, following its historical approach, found the conduct
by the union in Tree Fruits to be per se coercive upon Safeway and
held the union guilty of a section 8 (b) (4) (ii) (B) violation."' The
court of appeals reversed the Board,2" and held that consumer picketing did not per se "threaten, coerce, or restrain" Safeway, the secondary employer, stating that such a holding would run afoul of
the first amendment's guarantee of free speech. The court said that
it was necessary to show that the secondary employer had in fact
been threatened, coerced, or restrained. According to the court, this
could be done by proving that the secondary employer had suffered
economic loss as a result of the consumer picketing. The Supreme
Court vacated the judgment of the court of appeals." Economic loss
or likelihood thereof was held not to be the test for product picketing,
at least not in the case of a secondary employer who handles numerous
products other than those being boycotted, the only loss being in the
sale of the struck product." The Court's reasoning appears to have
been based upon the belief that the loss in sales of one of many
products would not be a loss sufficient to threaten, coerce, or restrain
the secondary employer. Where this is the case, secondary consumer
picketing which asks the customers not to buy the primary employer's
product is lawful.
27 Perhaps secondary consumer picketing is best characterized as picketing at a secondary
site which would be unlawful if the store were not open for business to its customers.
28 Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 (Tree Fruits Labor Relations
Comm., Inc.), 132 N.L.R.B. 1172 (1961).
9
" Fruit & Vegetable Packers & Warehousemen, Local 760 v. NLRB, 308 F.2d 311 (D.C.
Cir. 1962), cert. granted, 374 U.S. 804 (1963).
30 Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
" The Court's conclusion that a loss in sales of the struck product is not sufficient to
show the secondary employer was threatened, coerced or restrained, at least not where the
retailer is selling numerous other products, gives no relief to the retailer who has a binding
contract with the primary employer, or one who has a large inventory of the struck product
on hand at the time the dispute arose and who has a large sum tied up in overhead, transportation, and advertising costs.
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While the legislative history of the 1959 amendments does not
show a clear distinction between a secondary boycott appeal and a
product boycott appeal, the Court found that a distinction does
exist. There are, therefore, two types" of secondary consumer picketing: (1) lawful picketing to appeal to customers not to buy the
struck product (product boycott) and (2) unlawful picketing
"which persuades the customers of a secondary employer to stop all
trading with him. . . ."" (secondary boycott).' The Court found
that the picketing in front of Safeway was designed only to ask
the customers not to buy the struck product. As Safeway had
numerous other products to sell, loss in the sale of one product
would not be sufficient to threaten, coerce, or restrain Safeway. Any
loss in the sale of Washington State apples was said to be a result
caused by diminished consumer purchases in the struck product,
rather than by pressure designed by the union to inflict general
injury upon the secondary employer's business. Therefore, "when
consumer picketing is employed only to persuade customers not to
buy the struck product, the union's appeal is closely confined to
the primary dispute,' ' " and it is not an unfair labor practice even
though it might have caused Safeway to stop buying Washington
State apples. The Court did not say that such picketing could not
be coercive, but merely that it is not to be considered coercive when
it is confined to persuading customers to boycott a product produced
by the primary employer and sold by a secondary employer who has
numerous other products to sell. This reasoning amounts to a declaration that product picketing is merely an extension of the primary
dispute to the premises of the secondary employer.
The Court expressed the belief that Congress would not outlaw
peaceful picketing unless it reached an undesirable result which experience has established flows from that particular type of picketing
(an isolated evil). Further, had Congress intended to outlaw peaceful
picketing it would have expressly done so, as it had done in section
8 (b) (7) of the act.' Since section 8 (b) (4) does not refer specifi"SAccording to the Court. Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. 58, 70 (1964).
"3Id. at 71.

" The distinction between these two terms must be kept in mind, for although all
secondary boycotts are unlawful, only a secondary consumer boycott which threatens, coerces, or restrains the secondary employer for the purpose of causing him to cease doing
business with another is unlawful. Of course, if the union has an unlawful objective, the
secondary consumer picketing is unlawful even though it does not threaten, coerce, or restrain the secondary employer.
a' Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. 58, 72 (1964).
"e Section 8 (b) (7) makes it unlawful for a union "to picket or cause to be picketed, or
threaten to picket or cause to be picketed, any employer where an object thereof is ....
National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. 5 158(7) (1964).

SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 19:567

cally to picketing, other than in the proviso, the Court resorted to
the legislative history of the 1959 amendments to determine if Congress indicated a clear intent to ban all secondary consumer picketing."
Looking only to the supporters" of the Landrum-Griffin Bill,39 the
Court concluded that Congress only intended to proscribe consumer
picketing in front of a secondary site when the union was asking the
customers to boycott the entire store. The legislative history did not
show with the requisite clarity an intent to proscribe product picketing. The fact that the supporters of the bill did not refer to consumer picketing, but only secondary boycott picketing, was reason
to conclude, the Court surmised, that Congress must have been aware
that consumer picketing had been held to be valid."
Merely because the proviso of section 8 (b) (4) sanctions "publicity, other than picketing," did not require a finding of congressional intent to proscribe peaceful picketing.41 The Court reasoned
that because Congress was aware of possible infringements upon free
speech, 2 the proviso was added to allow the union to appeal for a
consumer boycott of the secondary employer by means other than
picketing, even though the publicity coerced or threatened the secondary employer, so long as it did not have the effect of inducing a
work stoppage.
C. Board Acceptance Of Tree Fruits
The Board has followed Tree Fruits in every subsequent product
3 Resort to legislative history is proper if the statute to be construed is considered
ambiguous. See Annot., 70 A.L.R. 5 (1931). However, because of compromise and ambiguity
in the legislative history itself, resort to the legislative history may be of doubtful aid. This
would appear to be true of § 8(b) (4) of the act.
38Mr. Justice Harlan criticized the majority of the Court for inferring that silence of
the supporters of the Landrum-Griffin Bill on the subject of product picketing indicated
their intent not to ban this type of consumer picketing at a secondary site. Tree Fruits,
377 U.S. 58, 92 (1964). It would seem that the Court violated the rules of proper analysis
on any intellectual discourse by looking at only one side of an argument. Furthermore, the
Court did not cite any legislative history showing Congress intended not to proscribe product
picketing.
The Court also may have been inconsistent in failing to give weight to Senator Kennedy's
statement as to the purpose of the § 8 (b) (4) proviso. Senator Kennedy, a supporter of the
proviso, said, "We were not able to persuade the House conferees to permit picketing in front
of that secondary shop, but were able to persuade them to agree that the union shall be
free to conduct informational activity short of picketing." 105 CONG. REC. 17898-899
(1959). (Emphasis added.)
a"The Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, 29 U.S.C., Chap. 7,
subchap. II, §§ 151-168 (1964).
45
NLRB v. Brewery Workers Union, 272 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1959); NLRB v. Laundry
Drivers Union, Local 928, 262 F.2d 617 (9th Cir. 1958); NLRB v. Business Mach. & Offce
Appliance Mechanics Conference Bd., 228 F.2d 553 (2d Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 351 U.S.
962 (1956). This is in accord with a practice sometimes followed: if Congress was aware
that past law had been construed a particular way, the absence of language to change the
old theory is indication that it was to be preserved.
41 Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. 58, 63 (1964).
"'Of course, this bill as any other bill is limited by the constitutional right of free
speech." 105 CONG. REc. 15673 (1959) (remarks of Senator Griffin).
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picketing case. To date, however, it has not been faced with a fact
situation largely deviating from that considered by the Court in
Tree Fruits. Two of the cases decided by the Board, however, provide some interesting additions to the evolving law of secondary
picketing.'
In Teamsters Union, Local 150 (Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Sacramento)," the union, having a dispute with Coca Cola, began product
picketing in front of various stores selling the struck product. One
of the picketers cautioned a manager of one of the stores that a lot
of union customers would not cross the picket line, and asked if the
profits from the sale of Coca Cola could make up for the loss of
general business. It was held that the mere likelihood of a consumer
boycott would not convert lawful product picketing into unlawful
secondary boycott picketing. Furthermore, since at the time the
threat of a consumer boycott was made only product picketing was
being conducted, the manager had no reason to fear the picketing
would cause a secondary boycott-this, perhaps, ignores the realities
of the situation.
In the Trial Examiner's opinion, adopted by the Board, it was said,
"if the picketing was designed to induce a boycott of the store . . .
rather than a boycott of the product, there would be a violation ....
This language implies a common sense approach to secondary picketing, viz., if the picketing and the legend on the picket sign convey
a plea to boycott the secondary employer or a signal not to cross the
picket line, the picketing is designed to achieve a secondary boycott.
In Chicago Typographical Union, Local 16 (Alden Press, Inc.),"
the union was engaged in picketing directed at the products of a nonunion printer with whom it had a dispute. An authorized union
speaker remarked to the secondary employer that the union would
"get tough" and "bring some pressure to bear" on him. Such comments were held to amount to general threats of damage to the
neutral employer's business and, therefore, in violation of section
8 (b) (4) (ii) (B) of the act. Furthermore, the fact that picketing
had taken place at employee entrances was evidence that it was
designed to induce or encourage the secondary employees in violation
of section 8 (b) (4) (i) (B).
The most interesting aspect of Alden Press is that the Board found
the product picketing itself, apart from the accompanying unlawful
4' See also the product picketing cases decided subsequent to Tree Fruits, discussed in
text accompanying notes 88-90 and notes 96-103.
44 151 N.L.R.B. No. 86 (1965).
41 Ibid.
6151
N.L.R.B. No. 152 (1965).
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activities described above, was "publicity, other than picketing" and
within the safeguard of the proviso to section 8 (b) (4). This reasoning was motivated by the fact that no evidence was presented that
the primary employer's products were being sold in the areas being
picketed. The Board stated that picketing requires confrontation
between the picketers and employees, customers, or suppliers, and
that in the absence of such confrontations, it is publicity other than
picketing.
IV.

PICKETING AND FREE SPEECH

Anytime limitations upon the right to picket are sought, the
argument is likely to arise that picketing is absolutely protected as
free speech under the first amendment to the Constitution. Because
the majority" of the Court in Tree Fruits found that Congress did not
intend to proscribe secondary consumer picketing when the union's
appeal is limited to a boycott of the product, the constitutionality of
section 8 (b) (4) was not brought directly into question. " The remainder of this Comment will focus upon types of secondary consumer picketing which, it will be submitted, are not protected under
the Tree Fruits decision. As a preliminary step to the consideration
47 Mr. Justce Black, however, in his concurring opinion averred that the
legislative history
of the 1959 amendments to the Taft-Hartley Act indicated an intent to proscribe all picketing at a secondary site, including secondary consumer picketing. From this premise, he concluded that the statute was an unconstitutional infringement upon the guarantee of freedom
of speech in the first amendment to the Constitution. Justice Black argued that while patrolling may not be speech, the dissemination of information about their labor dispute by
the patrollers is free speech, and that when the two are intermingled the patrolling aspect
of picketing should receive the protection extended to the speech aspect. Mr. Justice Black
summed up his views as follows:
[W]e have neither a case in which picketing is banned because the picketers
are asking others to do something unlawful nor a case in which all picketing
is, for reason of public order, banned. Instead, we have a case in which picketing, otherwise lawful, is banned only where the picketers express particular
views. The result is an abridgment of the freedom of these picketers to tell
a part of the public their side of a labor controversy, a subject the free discussion of which is protected by the First Amendment.
377 U.S. 58, 79 (1964). The Court took the opposite view in Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S.
559, 563 (1965).
Mr. Justice Harlan, in his dissent, agreed with Justice Black that Congress intended to
proscribe all secondary picketing. He felt, however, that this did not render the act unconstitutional. His argument for constitutionality was based upon two premises: (1) picketing has been held by the Court to be more than free speech, that is, picketing has a speechplus effect (signal effect) which causes something more than the message carried by the
picketers to be conveyed to others; and (2) Congress has recognized that there should be
a balance of interest between the union and the neutral employer whom section 8 (b) (4)
was designed to protect. Congress decided that "publicity, other than picketing" would be
more in keeping with the public interest when information is to be disseminated in front of
a secondary site.
48 Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. 58, 76 (1964). The Court will not decide a constitutional
question if there is some other ground upon which the case can be decided. Ashwander v. T.V.A.,
297 U.S. 288 (1936).
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of these suggested limitations upon the right to picket, however, it
will be necessary to examine the relationship between picketing and
free speech.
The National Labor Relations Act"' does not expressly give a union
the right to picket, but this right can be inferred from provisions
in the act and from the first and fourteenth amendments to the Constitution. Section 13 of the act states that nothing "shall be construed
so as... to interfere with or impede or diminish in any way the right
to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right."
Picketing may be considered as a segment of a strike and, therefore,
when otherwise lawful, protected activity. Section 8 (c) further extends refuge to picketing, viz.: "the expressing of any views, arguments, or opinions, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written,
printed, graphic or visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of
an unfair labor practice . . .if such expression contains no threat
of reprisal or force or promise of benefit." Section 7 of the act protects picketing as a type of concerted activity. Further, the first
amendment, extended to the states through the fourteenth amendment, provides a general guarantee of free speech, and thus provides
protection to picketing in instances where picketing can be considered free speech. The limitations upon picketing imposed by sections 8 (b) (4) and 8 (b) (7) of the act have been found not to be
abridgments of freedom of expression."
The relationship between peaceful picketing and freedom of speech
was explored in Thornhill v. Alabama." In Thornhill, the Court
held a state statute unconstitutional because it banned peaceful
picketing by placing a limitation on "every practicable method whereby the facts of a labor dispute may be publicized in the vicinity of
the place of the business of an employer."'" In a case 3 subsequent to
4'929 U.S.C. §§ 151-66 (1964).

"0Electrical Workers Union v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694 (1951); Truck Drivers and Helpers
Union, Local 728 v. NLRB, 249 F.2d 512 (D.C. Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 958
(1958); Brick & Clay Workers Union v. Deena Artware, 198 F.2d 637 (6th Cir. 1952),
cert. denied, 344 U.S. 897 (1952); Printing Specialties & Paper Converters Union v. NLRB,
171 F.2d 331 (9th Cir. 1948).
The Court has been willing to give section 13 a broad interpretation. See NLRB v.
Drivers Union, Local 639, 362 U.S. 274 (1959). The freedom of expression granted by
section 8(c), however, is limited by section 8(b) (4) of the act. See Electrical Workers
Union v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694, 703 (1950).
"' 3 10 U.S. 88 (1940). For a general discussion of the historical development of picketing
and free speech, see Farmer and Williamson, Picketing and the Injunctive Power of State
Courts-From Thornhill to Vogt, 35 U. DET. L.J. 431 (1950); Jaffe, In Defense of the
Supreme Court's Picketing Doctrine, 41 MIcH. L. REv. 1037 (1943); Teller, Picketing and
Free Speech, 56 HARV. L. REv. 180 (1942); The Supreme Court and the Right of Free

Speech and Press, Annot., 2 L.Ed.2d 1706, 1726 (1957).

52Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88, 100 (1940).
5
Milk Drivers Union, Local 753 v. Meadowmoor Dairies, Inc., 312 U.S. 287 (1941).
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Thornhill, the Court upheld an injunction of peaceful picketing that
was considered a part of a pattern involving force. It may be concluded that picketing must be considered in the context in which it
arises, and that it is not per se free speech. Merely because picketing
includes an element of speech does not necessarily make the picketing
itself speech."
The "effect" of the picketing also may place a limitation upon the
speech aspect of picketing. While picketing generally is considered
to be the most efficacious means for a union to publicize its dispute,
the picketing may produce an effect beyond that which the union,
by the legend on the picket sign, expressly sought to bring about.
The Supreme Court's conception is summed up in Building Service
Employees v. Gazzam:ss
This Court has said that picketing is in part an exercise of the right
of free speech guaranteed by the Federal Constitution. But since picketing is more than speech and establishes a locus in quo that has far more
potential for inducing action or nonaction than the message the pickets

convey, this Court has not hesitated to uphold a state's restraint of acts
and conduct which are an abuse of the right to picket ....

The Court thereby took judicial notice of the fact that picketing may
have a "signal" effect. If the legend of the picket sign asks customers
not to buy a certain brand of goods, but because of the presence of
a picket line customers boycott the store, the picketing may be said
to have a signal effect.
The theory of product picketing is that the customers will cross
the picket line and, if they sympathize with the union, merely refuse
to buy the struck product. Customers of a secondary employer may,
however, spontaneously look upon picketing at the secondary site as
being directed against the secondary employer rather than against
one of the products he handles." These customers may boycott the
store entirely without reading the legend on the picket sign. Others
who read the picket sign may feel that one who handles a struck
product is unfair to the union. Further, if a complicated message
must be conveyed, such as product picketing at a secondary site, the
"'Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 559, 563 (1965); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 555
(1965); Building Service Employees Union v. Gazzam, 339 U.S. 532 (1950); Teamsters
Union v. Hanke, 339 U.S. 470 (1950); Hughes v. Superior Court of Cal., 339 U.S. 460
(1950); Giboney v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949); Carpenters & Joiners
Union, Local 213 v. Ritter's Cafe, 315 U.S. 722 (1942).
55 339 U.S. 532 (1950).
"Id. at 536-37.
5
In Superior Derrick Corp. v. NLRB, 273 F.2d 891, 896 (5th Cir. 1960), the court
stated, "To a loyal unionist it is both a spontaneous plea not to engage in any business
activity with those behind the picket curtain and an instantaneous branding of 'unfairness'
on those engaged in activity behind the picket line."
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legend may not make it abundantly clear to the customers that the
boycott appeal is limited to a product. In addition, there may be some
customers who do not sympathize with the union, but nevertheless
prefer not to brave a picket line. If a substantial number of the
customers decide to avoid the store so long as the picketing continues,
the result would appear to be a secondary boycott irrespective of the
union's objective.
The signal effect of picketing may be an "isolated evil" which
Congress sought to ban in section 8 (b) (4), and, therefore, signal
picketing cannot be equivocated to free speech. The Court in Tree
Fruits acknowledged that picketing may have a "signal" effect which
"persuades the customers of a secondary employer to stop all trading
with him .. ",Although the public" might not read the legend of
the picket sign, and for that reason assume the picketing was against
the secondary employer, "be that as it may, our holding today simply
takes note of the fact that a broad condemnation of peaceful picketing . . . has never been adopted by Congress. . . .""The mere
likelihood of a signal effect and a secondary boycott does not require
a finding that consumer picketing necessarily produces this result.
Therefore, it is not per se coercive upon the secondary employer.
V. PROSPECTIVE LIMITATIONS ON PRODUCT PICKETING

The discussion to this point has focused upon the right of a union
to picket a product sold by a secondary employer. It should not be
assumed, however, that a union has an absolute right, by means of
picketing, to ask customers of a secondary employer to boycott a
struck product. There are three possible limitations on this right.
A. The Foreseeable Consequences Of Product Picketing
It has often been said that one is presumed to have intended the
natural and foreseeable consequences of his acts. Suppose that a union
pickets a struck product which is being sold by a neutral employer,
but that, because of the picketing, many customers boycott the
secondary employer entirely. If a consumer boycott is considered
58 Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. 58, 71 (1964).
59There are several reasons why customers might refuse to enter a store where there is

picketing, even though the picketing is designed only as a primary product boycott appeal.
When a picket line appears in front of a store, two presumptions normally arise in the
minds of many customers of the store: first, that the employees of the store are on strike,
and secondly, that the employees of that store believe their employer to be unfair. The
legend of the picket sign may or may not rebut these presumptions, and the picketing is
likely to evoke several responses from the customers.
The union cannot picket to inform a single or a few customers. Millmen and Cabinet
Makers Union, Local 550 (Steiner Lumber Co.), 153 N.L.R.B. No. 86 (1965).
6°Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. 58, 71 (1964).
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natural under the attendant circumstances, then the secondary boycott may be a foreseeable consequence of the union's product picketing. One may reasonably conclude under such circumstances that
the union intended a secondary boycott.
Following the language of section 8 (b) (4) (ii) (B) of the act, the
Board and the courts will look to the means used or the object sought
to determine if the union's secondary consumer picketing is lawful."' It is submitted that the additional element, "effect," should be
introduced where the result, although not expressed as an object nor
perhaps even intended, was a natural and foreseeable consequence of
the picketing. " 'While an intermediary effect and object should not
be considered to be synonymous, " a foreseeable effect which flows
naturally from the picketing permits an inference that the effect
was an objective." According to one court of appeals, "the effect of
the picketing is one of the circumstances considered in determining

41In

any picketing situation two elements,

the means used and the object sought,

must be considered. As these terms are used in section 8 (b) (4) (ii) (B), means refers to
threatening, coercing or restraining the secondary employer by the use of picketing or
any other methods; the object relates to whether or not the union intended the mean'
used to force or require the secondary employer to cease doing business with another employer. Thus, a violation of the act occurs if the union threatens, coerces or restrains the
secondary employer with the object of forcing him to cease doing business with another
employer. It is not a violation of the act if the secondary employer voluntarily ceases to
do business with the primary employer, nor is it a violation if the secondary employer is
threatened, coerced or restrained, but as a result of some lawful union objective. Cf. NLRB
v. Servette, 377 U.S. 46, 57 (1964). There the Court said, "the warnings that handbills
would be distributed in front of noncooperating stores are not prohibited as 'threats' within
subsection (ii). The statutory protection for the distribution of handbills would be undermined if a threat to engage in protected conduct were not itself protected." See also
Teamsters Union, Local 150 (Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Sacramento), 151 N.L.R.B. No.
86 (1965).
"5 Section 8(b)(4) does not limit the right of a union to exert primary action, even
though it has incidental or even foreseeable secondary consequences. Seafarers Union v.
NLRB, 265 F.2d 585 (D.C. Cir. 1959); Rabouin v. NLRB, 195 F.2d 906, 912 (2d Cir.
1952). The union, however, would be responsible if the secondary effect was the purpose
of the primary activity, Petroleum Employees Union v. NLRB, 249 F.2d 332 (8th Cir.
1957), or if it was the expressed purpose of the picketing. Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
03 It is not necessary that the unlawful conduct be the primary objective of the picketing. Electrical Workers Union v. NLRB, 341 U.S. 694 (1951). The mere existence of a
vague and speculative hope of obtaining an unlawful objective, however, does not, in itself,
make otherwise lawful picketing unlawful. Seafarers Union v. NLRB, 265 F.2d 585 (D.C.
Cir. 1959). Nor is picketing unlawful because it has some intermediary effect, particularly if
the statute requires an unlawful object as does section 8 (b) (4). Operating Engineers Union,
Local 545 (Syracuse Supply Co.), 139 N.L.R.B. 778 (1962). But if the unlawful effect
naturally follows from the picketing, an inference that the union had an unlawful objective (unlawful motivation) would not be unreasonable. Understandably, the union should
not be held accountable for intermediary effects which it could not have anticipated in
the normal course of events; but by definition an effect which is a natural and probable
consequence of the picketing can reasonably be anticipated.
64 National Maritime Union (Delta Steamship Lines, Inc.), 147 N.L.R.B. 1328, 1330-331
(1964). The Board said, "a picket line is known for its 'signal' effect--that all union men
make common cause with the picketing union. . . . The Board in determining legality of
object does not differentiate between the ultimate, alternative, conditional, or immediate
nature of the various objectives that may be involved in the activities of a labor organization,"
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in any case what the purpose was in so far as it was the natural and
65
logical consequence of what the picketers are saying and doing."
The effect of picketing cannot be ignored:
Publication in a newspaper, or by distribution of circulars, may convey
the same information or make the same charge as do those patrolling a
picket line. But the very purpose of a picket is to exert influences, and
it produces consequences, different from other modes of communication.
The loyalties and responses evoked and exacted by picket lines are unlike those flowing from appeals by printed word."
In several recent decisions, attempts have been made to pierce the
foreseeable consequences doctrine as applied to labor situations. In
NLRB v. Darlington Mfg. Co.,6' the Court said that although the
complete closing of a business to avoid unionization by an employer
may deter employees in other plants (in which the closing employer
has little or no interest) from unionizing, the doctrine of foreseeable
consequences does not apply. The act of closing a business is, itself,
too ambiguous."8 It would appear that such an employer cannot be
held liable for the foreseeable consequences of closing his business
because (1) he has nothing to gain, economically speaking, from
going out of business to avoid bargaining with a union, and (2)
going out of business is not in itself an unfair labor practice. If an
employer's action causes union organization or bargaining to be
impaired, such effect is said to be merely incidental."' The same is
not true for a union which is picketing a secondary employer; if the
picketing causes a secondary boycott, pressure is exerted on the secondary employer to cease dealing with the primary employer. This
effect cannot be considered incidental. A union picketing in front of
a secondary store is directly involved in an effect of its picketing.
Activity directed against the primary employer's product, i.e.,
picketing which asks customers of a secondary employer not to buy
a struck product is lawful primary activity under the Tree Fruits
decision. Nevertheless, a secondary boycott has never been labeled
lawful activity;"0 thus, picketing which affects the secondary employer's business beyond the extent of loss in sales of the struck
product should not be considered lawful. This is not activity which
is directed against the primary employer's products. The very purpose of section 8 (b) (4) is to prevent the exertion of pressure on a
6' NLRB v. Electrical Workers Union, Local 3, 317 F.2d 193, 199 (2d Cir. 1963).
66 Hughes v. Superior Court of California, 339 U.S. 460, 465 (1963).
67380 U.S. 263
(1965).
68 Id. at 269. The Court did indicate,
however, that the doctrine would be applied in
cases where the business was not completely closed.
68 Id. at 276.
" Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. 58 (1964).
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secondary employer. Whether the union or the customers of the
neutral employer are the direct cause of the boycott is immaterial,
for the boycott would not have come about without the presence
of the picket line.
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals made a more direct attack
upon the foreseeable consequences doctrine in National Maritime
Union of America v. NLRB.' In reference to the foreseeable effect
of the union's secondary picketing at a neutral employer's loading
dock, the court said:
Such a phrase, with its tort implications, is not descriptive of a proper
basis for concluding that picketing is signal picketing because a work
stoppage might be highly probable in response to what was genuinely
intended to be nothing more than informational picketing. . . . Under
such circumstances there would be no violation of section 8(b) (4)
even though a reasonably prudent man would have foreseen that such
cessation of business would occur."2
This statement, not acquiesced in by the Board, 3 is weakened by the
fact that the court found unlawful motivation on the part of the
union without the necessity of resorting to the foreseeable consequences doctrine and, also, the court held the union's conduct to be
signal picketing.74 If a union is to be held liable for "signal picketing"
without the need for a showing of intent to cause a secondary boycott, it is immaterial whether the phrase "foreseeable consequence"
or the phrase "signal effect" is used to describe the unlawful effect. 5
The foreseeable consequences doctrine has not yet been applied to
secondary consumer picketing which results in a secondary boycott,
probably because prior to Tree Fruits secondary consumer picketing
had been held to be per se unlawful." It is possible to draw an analogy
between the cases involving union coercion of a secondary employer
M

7 342 F.2d
7

538 (2d Cir. 1965).

71

1d. at 546.
In National Maritime Union (Houston Maritime Ass'n, Inc.), 147 N.L.R.B. 1243, 1245

(1964), the Board said "in setting up its picket line, Respondent [union] must be deemed
to have known-and intended-the foreseeable consequence of its conduct ......
"
Also, in National Maritime Union of America (Delta Steamship Lines, Inc.), 147 N.L.R.B.
1328, 1330 (1964), the Board said, "we are mindful of the fact that in the maritime-longshore industry, a picket line is known for its 'signal' effect-that all union men make common cause with the picketing union."
The Board's thinking is more in line with that of the Supreme Court. See notes 55-56

and accompanying text.
74 342 F.2d at 546.
"' The only possible distinction between signal effect and foreseeable consequence is that

the phrase "signal effect" has traditionally been limited to picketing situations. Either
theory may be used to hold a union liable for its unexpressed intention if a prohibited
effect actually occurred. The two phrases are sometimes used interchangeably. See Houston
Maritime, 147 N.L.R.B. 1243 (1964).
71 See notes 24-2 5 supra.
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and those cases holding a union accountable for the inducement of
secondary employees. That is, if the union is to be liable for inducing
employees of a secondary employer to cease work when it was foreseeable that its picketing would have this effect, then logically the
union should be held accountable if its secondary consumer picketing
coerces the secondary employer, if such an effect was foreseeable."
For example, if the facts show that the picketing has caused the
retailer general business loss, and that he intends to cease doing business with the primary employer if the picketing continues, and if this
effect followed naturally from the picketing, logically the secondary
employer has been threatened, coerced, or restrained in violation of
section 8 (b) (4) (ii) (B). "In such a case, the union does more than
merely follow the struck product; it creates a separate dispute with
the secondary employer.""5
Holding the union liable for the foreseeable consequences of secondary consumer picketing would merely be an extension of the
following established rules of law: (1) the doctrine of foreseeable
consequences as applied to union picketing which induces or restrains
the secondary employees, and as applied to employer action taken
against union activities; (2) liability for the signal effect of picketing;
and (3) the violation of the act, committed when the secondary consumer picket sign expressly asks the customers to boycott goods other
than the struck product. The Court has long since recognized that
the nature of picketing itself may be to cause a "signal" effect."'
"'The doctrine of foreseeable consequence is familiar to the field of labor law. In
Radio Officer's Union v. NLRB, 347 U.S. 17, 45 (1954), the Supreme Court stated that
"an employer's protestation that he did not intend to encourage or discourage must be
unavailing where a natural consequence of his action was such .... Concluding that encouragement or discouragement will result, it is presumed that he intended such consequence.
In such circumstances intent . . . is sufficiently established." Likewise, the Second Circuit
in NLRB v. IUE, Local 459 (Royal Typewriter), 228 F.2d 553, 560 (2d Cir. 1955), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 962 (1956), said, "It may be true that something less than a finding of
specific intent to induce or encourage employees will suffice. . . . If it were shown that
such inducement was the inevitable result or even the 'natural and probable consequence'
of the picketing this would perhaps be enough. Certainly if it were shown that the employees actually ceased work, no finding of intent would be necessary." In NLRB v. Erie
Resistor, 373 U.S. 221, 228 (1962), the Supreme Court said,
The outcome may well be the same when intent is founded upon the inherently discriminatory or destructive nature of the conduct itself. The employer in such cases must be held to intend the very consequences which
foreseeably and inescapably flow from his actions. . . . His conduct does
speak for itself-it is discriminatory and it does discourage . . . . [and]
it carries with it unavoidable consequences which the employer not only
foresaw but which he must have intended.
78 Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. 58, 72 (1964).
Once it has been demonstrated that the union's picketing did cause an unlawful object,
the union should have the burden of proving the alleged violation was not an unlawful
object. Teamsters Union, Locals 560 and 641 (Riss and Co., Inc.), 127 N.L.R.B. 1327,
1330 (1960).
"'See cases cited note 54 supra.
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When secondary consumer picketing causes a signal effect resulting
in a secondary boycott, it is submitted that the picketing should
come within the proscription intended by section 8 (b) (4) (ii) (B) ."
Picketing, however, which may permit an inference of an unlawful
object (e.g., product picketing at a secondary site), as opposed to
picketing which does have an unlawful object (e.g., an expressed
appeal for a secondary boycott) cannot and should not be enjoined
until the foreseeable consequence, a secondary boycott, has been
proven an actual result. That is, although product picketing may
induce customers to boycott the retailer, it may have no effect at all,
or even the opposite effect if some people patronize the stores in
response to the union's picketing."1
The foreseeable consequences doctrine probably should be limited
to situations where the message on the union's picket sign would lead
a customer of the secondary employer to conclude that the dispute is
with the retailer. Thus, the union should not fear a section 8 (b) (4)
violation if the legend makes it clear that the boycott appeal is
limited to the struck product-as a legend reading: "Please do not
buy Neuhoff meats." However, there may be other avenues of
attack.
B. Employers Dealing In A Few Products
The Court in Tree Fruits characterized Safeway as an employer
selling "numerous" products who, in the face of possible loss in one
of the products, was not likely to be threatened, coerced, or restrained
by the economic loss. 8 What would have been the result if Safeway
so That this was the purpose of section 8 (b) (4) (ii) (b) is clearly indicated by the
legislative history of the act. 105 CoNG. REc. 15672-673 (1959)
(remarks of Senators
Brown and Griffin); 105 CONG. REC. 19771 (1959) (remarks of Senator Goldwater).
"t The procedure to be followed by a complaining employer is set forth in the act.
Section 10 (1) of the National Labor Relations Act states that the Board will petition the
district court for injunctive relief if it has reasonable cause to believe that an unfair
labor practice charge is true. 29 U.S.C. § 160(1). In relation to § 8(b)(4), injunctive
relief would be appropriate if there is reasonable cause to believe a secondary boycott has
been caused by the union's picketing.
When the union's conduct violates the act, the Board should grant a request for an
injunction. It should be remembered that an injunction is not issued to prevent the union
from advising the public of a labor dispute, but because the manner in which the picketers
conducted themselves or the objectives sought by the union violate the act or a state or
national policy designed for the protection of all citizens.
In 1963, 230 injunction litigation cases were filed with the Board. Of this number, 215
arose under § 10(l), and 70 of the petitions for injunctive relief were granted. 1963
N.L.R.B. ANNUAL REPORT at 184.
s The Board referred to Tree Fruits in American Federation of Television and Radio
Artists Union, Local 55 (Great Western Broadcasting Co.), 150 N.L.R.B. No. 46 (1964),
where it said, "The Supreme Court has held that picketing appeals to customers of a
large retailer.
... (Emphasis added.)
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had sold only fruits or only apples? Safeway was not an "ally" of
the packagers of Washington State apples."3
Mr. Justice Harlan showed his concern for the possible consequences of Tree Fruits by presenting a hypothetical problem" involving a similar situation in which a secondary employer had sales
volume and profits composed largely of a struck product.
To borrow from Justice Harlan, consider a service station which
buys eighty per cent of its products from the Petro Oil Company.
To this employer there is little difference, if any, between a picket
sign reading, "Don't buy Petro Products," and one which says, "Don't
patronize Herb's Petro Station." The closer the relationship between
the struck product and the secondary employer's business, the closer
a union's picketing is to secondary boycott picketing. In this instance
the union's picketing does "more than merely follow the struck product; it creates a separate dispute with the secondary employer."'"
There is, then, the possibility that a product boycott appeal will be
the same as a secondary boycott appeal."
A comparison between the position of a large retailer who sells
numerous products, as in Tree Fruits, and that of a retailer who
relies upon a primary employer to supply all or most of the retailer's
inventory raises an obvious question for future secondary consumer
picketing cases. Can the union, in the latter case, still picket the
secondary employer's products so long as the appeal is limited to a
boycott of the struck products? Or, can the union picket only to the
extent that the picketing against the struck products does not become
a secondary boycott appeal, that is, only to the degree that a boycott
of the struck products sold by the secondary employer would not be
the same as a boycott of the secondary employer's whole business?"
The Board came close to facing the problem in Milimen and Cabinet
Makers Union, Local 550 (Steiner Lumber Co.)." s Steiner Lumber
Company supplied lumber to a contractor for use in building homes.
3

See note 19 supra and accompanying text.
(1964).

84 Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. 58, 83

Isd. at 72.

J.G. Roy & Sons Co. v. NLRB, 251 F.2d 771 (1st Cir. 1958), the court said that
two employers were not made allies by the fact that there was a straight-line operation
between them, i.e., an operation in which the business of the primary employer continues
in a direct line into the business of the secondary employer, as, for example, an oil company which supplies a service station with most of its products. Something more than just
a straight-line operation must be found before the secondary employer will be deprived of
the protection of § 8 (b) (4).
87 The ambiguity is exemplified in Great Western Broadcasting, 150 N.L.R.B. No. 46
(1964), where the Board said, "The Supreme Court has held that picketing appeals to
customers of a large retailer, which are limited to requesting customers to refrain from
purchasing the particular product of the primary employer, did not constitute coercion
within the meaning of the Act." (Emphasis added.)
88153 N.L.R.B. No. 86 (195).
8In
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Following a dispute with Steiner, the union began picketing in front
of the secondary employer's homes. The legend of the picket sign
stated that the dispute was with the primary employer, and only
asked that the customers not buy the struck product, lumber. The
Board held that the picketing was designed to have customers boycott
the secondary employer, since the homebuyer could scarcely buy a
home without buying the lumber in the home. 9 The Board relied
upon language in Tree Fruits to find a violation: "picketing which
persuades the customers to stop all trading with him was also to be
barred."9
The Steiner holding is very logical. If picketing the product
amounts to picketing the secondary employer's business, the union's
appeal is designed to effectuate a secondary boycott. This reasoning
should also be applied in cases where the struck product can be separated from other products sold by the secondary employer if the struck
product constitutes a sufficient portion of his business so that a boycott of the product can be said to affect his business generally. Looking to the language of the Court in Tree Fruits,"' the language used
by the supporters of section 8 (b) (4)," and to the language of the
act,oa secondary consumer picketing which results in or amounts to
a boycott of the secondary employer's business is unlawful. Any
other interpretation would seem to make it impossible for an unconcerned employer to receive the protection of section 8 (b) (4) (ii) (B)
so long as the boycott appeal on the union's picket signs was limited
to the primary employer's products (struck products), even though
the picketing inflicted injury on the secondary employer's business
generally.94
" The Board also found the picketing was designed to induce or encourage employees
of the secondary employer not to handle the struck product, a violation of § 8 (b) (4) (i) (B).
It is interesting to note that the Board held the union accountable for inducing the employees
even though only one employee failed to show up for future work during the picketing:
"It exemplifies a potential effect which may have been exercised on other employees." Ibid.

Ibid.
"On the other hand, when consumer picketing is employed to persuade customers
not to trade at all with the secondary employer, the latter stops buying the struck product,
not because of a falling demand, but in response to pressure designed to inflict injury on his
business generally. In such a case, the union does more than merely follow the struck product; it creates a separate dispute with the secondary employer." Tree Fruits, 377 U.S. 58, 72
(1964). The Court also said, "picketng which persuades the customers of a secondary employer to stop all trading with him was also to be barred." Supra at 71.
92See notes 12 and 80 supra.
91

" It shall be unlawful for a union "(ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person . . .
where an object thereof is: (B) forcing or requiring any person to cease . . . dealing in the
products of any other producer . . . or to cease doing business with any other person."
The94National Labor Relations Act, note 1 supra.
Cf. Richfield Oil, 95 N.L.R.B. 1191 (1951).
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C. "Products Of Any Other Producer""s
As has been pointed out, a striking union has no dispute with a
secondary employer and, therefore, cannot picket the secondary employer, but it can conduct a picketing campaign against a struck
product being sold by the secondary employer. It follows that before
a union can picket at the premises of a neutral employer there must
be a product produced by the primary employer which the customers
of the neutral employer can be asked to boycott. In a case like Tree
Fruits where the retailer is selling a definable product of the primary
employer which it, in turn, offers for sale to its customers, the union
finds no difficulty in picketing a product. Not all products are so
easily ascertainable.
In Television and Radio Artists (Great Western Broadcasting
Corp.) ," a union having a dispute with a television station sought
a consumer boycott of the station's advertisers by means of verbal
requests and distribution of leaflets. Disregarding the holding of
the Ninth Circuit," the Board found that these advertisers were
dealing in products produced by the television station, since the
station by its advertising enhanced the economic value of the products
sold by the advertisers."
What constitute "products of any other producer" was further
explored in Building Serv. Employeees Union (University Cleaning
Co.)." A cleaning establishment contracted out cleaning and janitorial services to various concerns. The union began picketing at the
situs of several of the customers, including United Airlines and A & P,
with signs bearing the legend: "The contract cleaners employed here
are not members of Local 254, AFL-CIO." The Board adopted the
Trial Examiners opinion that the only objective the union possibly
could have had was to force the secondary employers to cease doing
business with the primary employer, saying that "neither United nor
A&P was purveying to its customers-who might have been inclined
to respect a product boycott line-any goods or services furnished by
the primary employer."1 0 In short, there was no product produced by
University Cleaning which United or A & P could have sold to their
"The National Labor Relations Act, § 8(b) (4), note 3 supra.
:6150 N.L.R.B. No. 46 (1964).
' Great Western Broadcasting Corp. v. NLRB, 310 F.2d 591 (9th Cir. 1962).
"oA position contrary to Great Western is taken in NLRB v. International Typographical
Union, Local 37 (D.C. Hawaii 1965), 52 CCH Lab Cas. 5 16,594, where picketers asked
customers of advertisers in a struck newspaper not to buy the advertised products. The
court held this amounted to a secondary boycott since the secondary employers did not sell
a struck product.
9
151 N.L.R.B. No. 32 (1965).
100 Ibid.
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customers; thus, there could be no product boycott. The union's
picketing and threats of picketing were therefore in violation of
section 8 (b) (4) (ii) (B) of the act.1"'
The reasoning in Great Western and University Cleaning conflicts.
Great Western involved "publicity, other than picketing," i.e., handbilling and verbal requests, but since the Board has held product
picketing to be "publicity, other than picketing,"'0 ' this is not a distinguishing point.0 3 What goods or services furnished by the television station were the advertisers of Great Western "purveying" to
its customers? It is submitted that the reasoning of University
Cleaning is by far the more reasonable. A union should not be
allowed to conduct picketing or publicity other than picketing at
the premises of a secondary employer unless that employer sells a
service or product produced or distributed by the primary employer.
In the absence of such a product, the picketing should be deemed to
be directed at the secondary employer and a violation of section
8 (b) (4) (ii) (B). Where there is no product to picket, the proscription against the secondary publicity is absolute: neither picketing nor
publicity other than picketing may lawfully be conducted.
VI.

SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION

The present status of lawful secondary consumer picketing requires
that it not: (1) have an object of inducing or encouraging an employee, or threatening, coercing or restraining the employer in violation of the National Labor Relations Act; (2) have any other object
prohibited by the act; (3) take place at an employee entrance; (4)
block consumer entrances; (5) give the customers the impression that
there is a dispute with the secondary employer; (6) be the picketing
of a retailer who does not handle the struck product; (7) cause a
work stoppage; (8) be violent; (9) extend the boycott appeal beyond
the struck product.
Before a union's secondary picketing will violate section 8 (b) (4)(ii) (B) of the act, it must "threaten, coerce, or restrain" the secondary employer for an object prohibited by the act. This require101Employees of University were not at the premises of the secondary employers during
the picketing. Had they been, the union may have been able to conduct common situs
picketing. Contra, Teamsters Union, Local 895 (Eastern New York Construction Employers,
Inc.), 153 N.L.R.B. No. 81 (1965).
'"°Chicago Typographical Union, Local 16 (Alden Press, Inc.), 151 N.L.R.B. No. 152
(1965).
'O Handbilling, truly "publicity, other than picketing" is much less likely to have the
signal effect picketing itself does. In some cases, however, where the handbillers walk back
and forth before the entrance to the secondary store, handbilling can take on the character
of picketing. For instance, see Service and Maintenance Employees Union, Local 399 (Burns
International Detective Agency), 136 N.L.R.B. 431 (1962).
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ment is somewhat frivolous, because the view seems to have developed
that if the product picketing is lawful it does not "threaten, coerce, or
restrain" the retailer within the meaning of the act,'- even though the
retailer cancels all future orders from the primary employer out of
fear of what will happen to his business if he does not. ' On the other
hand, if the picketing is unlawful, e.g., secondary boycott picketing,
the conduct threatens, coerces, or restrains the retailer within the
meaning of the act even though he is not fearful of the picketing.
A union, in certain circumstances, may lawfully picket at the
situs of an employer who is either primarily or secondarily involved
in its dispute with the struck employer. If the alleged secondary
employer is primarily involved, i.e., if he is an ally of the primary
employer, the union can, by means of picketing, ask the customers
to boycott both employers. If the other employer is only secondarily
involved, however, the union may direct its picketing only against
the struck products being sold by the secondary employer.
It has been submitted that there are three major limitations upon
the right to conduct product picketing. The picketing will amount
to a secondary boycott, and therefore be unlawful, if (1) a boycott
was a foreseeable consequence of the product picketing (signal picketing), or (2) the struck products represent such a large portion
of the secondary employer's business that the product picketing may
be said to have been designed to inflict injury on his business generally, or (3) the secondary employer is selling no product of the
struck employer which the customers can be asked to boycott.
Focusing primarily upon the labor hybrid of the foreseeable consequences doctrine, while that doctrine appears to present a valid
argument, proof sufficient to show that the secondary employer has
been threatened, coerced or restrained may be difficult indeed."° A
showing that the secondary employer suffered a general business loss
as a result of the picketing-i.e., that a substantial number of his
'

Congress sought to proscribe coercion designed to control the retailer's choice of a

supplier, not merely coercion in the abstract.
A number of cases have demonstrated that many employers when faced with picketing will adhere to the union's demand to cease dealing with the primary employer. See,
for example, Coca Cola Bottling, 151 N.L.R.B. No. 86 (1965); Colony Liquor Distributors,
Inc., 140 N.L.R.B. 1097 (1963).
" The union could take certain precautions to assure that its picketing would not
become secondary boycott picketing. It could include an additional item in its notice to
the secondary employer, which might read, "If you find that your customers are refusing
to enter Safeway because of the picketing, please notify the undersigned official so that the
problem may be corrected." It could also picket for short periods of time and make it
difficult to prove that the picketing caused a consumer boycott. However, once it has been
determined that past picketing has produced an unlawful result, future picketing will
probably be enjoined. See Electrical Workers Union, Local 25 (A.E. Electric), 148 N.L.R.B.
No. 152 (1964).
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customers have boycotted the store because of the consumer picketing- probably would have to be made. To date, the foreseeable consequences doctrine has been applied to union picketing which induced
or encouraged the secondary employees to leave their work, and to
employer conduct which threatened or restrained his employees in
violation of some provision of the act, but it has not been applied to
secondary consumer picketing which threatens, coerces or restrains
the secondary employer. This probably can best be explained by
the fact that prior to Tree Fruits secondary consumer picketing had
been held to per se threaten, coerce or restrain the secondary employer. There seems to be no reason why the Court should hold the
employer liable for the foreseeable consequences of his acts and not
treat the union similarly.
The union has no dispute with the secondary employer. By engaging in conduct known to create union sympathy and to bring
about a secondary boycott which will coerce the secondary employer,
there should be no difficulty in proving an object of causing cessation
of business between the neutral and primary employers. Having
found the union's picketing had at least an object prohibited by
section 8 (b) (4), it is of no consequence that the union's ultimate
aim was to have customers boycott only a product."' The public has
an interest in seeing that the right of a union to advise the public
of its labor dispute is balanced with the right of an employer to
carry on his business!"0 s On the one hand, a union should not be
punished if its message is clearly conveyed to the customers of the
secondary employer; on the other hand, the union should not escape
all liability because of a carefully worded picket sign, if in fact some
other message is conveyed.

107

Compare with language used by the Board in Delta Steamship, 147 N.L.R.B. 1328,

1331 (1964).
'" NLRB v. Erie Resistor Corp., 373 U.S. 221, 229 (1962).

